Abstract. This paper proposes a formal framework for studying information flow security in component-based systems. The security policy is defined and verified from the early steps of the system design. Two kinds of non-interference properties are formally introduced and for both of them, sufficient conditions that ensures and simplifies the automated verification are proposed. The verification is compositional, first locally, by checking the behavior of every atomic component and then globally, by checking the inter-components communication and coordination. The potential benefits are illustrated on a concrete case study about constructing secure heterogeneous distributed systems.
Introduction
The amount and complexity of nowadays conceived systems and software knows a continuous increase. Information protection and secure information flow between these systems is paramount and represent a great design challenge. Model driven security (MDS) [BDL06] is an innovative approach that tend to solve system-level security issues by providing an advanced modeling process representing security requirements at a high level of abstraction. Indeed, MDS guarantees separation of concerns between functional and security requirements, from early phases of the system development till final implementation.
Information flow security can be ensured using various mechanisms. Amongst the first approaches considered, ones find access control policies [SSM98, Kuh98] , that allow protecting data confidentiality by limiting access to data to be read or modified only by authorized users. Unfortunately, these mechanisms have been proven incomplete and limited since only by preventing the direct access to data, indirect (implicit) information flows are still possible given rise to the so called covert channels [SQSL05] . As an alternative, non-interference has been studied as a global property to characterize and to develop techniques ensuring information flow security. Initially defined by Goguen and Meseguer [GM82] , non-interference ensures that the system's secret information does not affect its public behavior.
In this work, we adapt the MDS approach to develop a component-based framework, named secBIP, that guarantees automated verification and implementation of secure information flow systems with respect to specific definition of non-interference. In general, component-based frameworks allow the construction of complex systems by composition of atomic components with communication and coordination operators. That is, systems are obtained from unitary atomic components that can be independently deployed and composed with other components. Component-based frameworks are usually well adopted for managing key issues for functional design including heterogeneity of components, distribution aspects, performance issues, etc. Nonetheless, the use of componentbased frameworks is also beneficial for establishing information flow security. Particularly, the explicit system architecture allows tracking easily intra and inter-components information flow.
The secBIP framework is built as an extension of the BIP [BBS06,BBB
+ 11] framework encompassing information flow security. secBIP allows to create systems that are secure by construction if certain local conditions hold for composed components. The secBIP extension includes specific annotations for classification of both data and interactions. Thanks to the explicit use of composition operators in BIP, the information flow is easily tracked within models and security requirements can be established in a compositional manner, first locally, by checking the behavior of atomic components and then globally, by checking the communication and coordination inter-components.
Information flow security has been traditionally studied separately for language-based models [SS01, SV98] (see also the survey [SM03] ) and trace-based models [McC88, McL94, ZL97, Man00] . While the former mostly focus on verification of data-flow security properties in programming languages, the latter is treating security in event-based systems. In secBIP, we achieve a useful combination between both aspects, data-flow and event-flow security, in a single semantics model. We introduce and distinguish two types of non-interference, respectively event non-interference and data non-interference. For events, non-interference states that the observation of public events should not allow to deduce any information about the occurrence of secret events. For data, it states that there is no leakage of secret data into public ones.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 recalls the main concepts of the component-based framework adopted in this work. In section 3, we formally introduce the security extension and we provide the two associated definitions of non-interference, respectively for data flows and event flows. Next, in section 4 we formally establish non-interference based on unwinding relations and we provide sufficient conditions that facilitate its automatic verification. In section 5, we provide a use-case as illustrative example. Section 6 discusses the related work and section 7 concludes and presents some lines for future work. All the proofs of technical results are given in the appendix.
Component-Based Design
The secBIP framework is built as an extension of the BIP framework introduced in [BBS06] . BIP stands for Behavior, Interaction and Priority, that is, the three layers used for the definition of components and their composition in this framework. BIP allows the construction of complex, hierarchically structured models from atomic components characterized by their behavior and their interfaces. Such components are transition systems enriched with data. Transitions are used to move from a source to a destination location. Each time a transition is taken, component data (variables) may be assigned new values, computed by user-defined functions (in C). Atomic components are composed by layered application of interactions and priorities. Interactions express synchronization constraints and do the transfer of data between the interacting components. Priorities are used to filter amongst possible interactions and to steer system evolution so as to meet performance requirements e.g., to express scheduling policies.
In this section, we briefly recall the key concepts of BIP which are further relevant for dealing with information flow security. In particular, we give a formal definition of atomic components and their composition through multiparty interactions. Priorities are not considered in this work.
Atomic Components
Definition 1 (atomic component). An atomic component B is a tuple (L, X, P , T ) where L is a set of locations, X is a set of variables, P is a set of ports and T ⊆ L × P × L is a set of port labelled transitions. For every port p ∈ P , we denote by X p the subset of variables exported and available for interaction through p. For every transition τ ∈ T , we denote by g τ its guard, that is, a boolean expression defined on X and by f τ its update function, that is, a parallel assignment {x := e x τ } x∈X to variables of X. 
is a valuation of exported variables X p and (4)
′ is obtained by applying f τ on x previously modified according to x ′′ p . Whenever a p-labelled successor exist in a state, we say that p is enabled in that state.
Composite Components
Composite components are obtained by composing an existing set of atomic
,n trough specific composition operators. We consider that atomic components have pairwise disjoint sets of states, ports, and variables i.e., for any two i = j from {1..n}, we have
the set of all locations, and X = n i=1 X i the set of all variables.
Definition 3 (interaction). An interaction a between atomic components is a triple (P a , G a , F a ), where P a ⊆ P is a set of ports, G a is a guard, and F a is an update function. By definition, P a uses at most one port of every component, that is, |P i ∩P a | ≤ 1 for all i ∈ {1..n}. Therefore, we simply denote P a = {p i } i∈I , where I ⊆ {1..n} contains the indices of the components involved in a and for all i ∈ I, p i ∈ P i . G a and F a are both defined on the variables exported by the ports in P a (i.e., p∈Pa X p ).
Definition 4 (composite component).
A composite component C = γ(B 1 , . . . , B n ) is obtained by applying a set of interactions γ to a set of atomic components B 1 , . . . B n .
Figure 2 presents a classical Producer-Buffer-Consumer example modeled in BIP. It consists of three atomic components, namely Producer, Buffer and Consumer. The Buffer is a shared memory placeholder, which is accessible by both the Producer and the Consumer. It holds into the local variable x the number of items available. The Buffer interacts with the Producer (res. Consumer) on the put (resp. get) interaction. On the put interaction, an item is added to the Buffer and x is incremented. On the get interaction, the Consumer removes an item from the Buffer, if at least one exists (the guard [x ≥ 1]), and x is decremented. Finally, the transitions labeled produce and consume do not require synchronization -they are executed alone (on singleton port interactions) by the respective components.
Definition 5 (composite component semantics).
their semantics, for all i = 1, n. The semantics of C is the labelled transition system lts(
where the set of states Q C = ⊗ n i=1 Q i , the set of labels Σ C = γ and the set of labelled transitions − → C is defined by the rule:
For each i ∈ I, x pi above denotes the valuation x i restricted to variables of X pi .
The rule expresses that a composite component C = γ(B 1 , . . . , B n ) can execute an interaction a ∈ γ enabled in state ((ℓ 1 , x 1 ), . . . , (ℓ n , x n )), iff (1) for each p i ∈ P a , the corresponding atomic component B i can execute a transition labelled by p i , and (2) the guard G a of the interaction holds on the current valuation of variables exported on ports participating in a. Execution of interaction a triggers first the update function F a which modifies variables exported by ports p i ∈ P a . The new values obtained, encoded in the valuation x ′′ pi , are then used by the components' transitions. The states of components that do not participate in the interaction remain unchanged.
Any finite sequences of interactions w = a 1 ...a k ∈ γ * executable by the composite component starting at some given initial state q 0 is named a trace. The set of all traces w from state q 0 is denoted by traces(C, q 0 ).
Information Flow Security
We explore information flow policies [DD77, BLP76, GM82] with focus on the noninterference property. In order to track information we adopt the classification technique and we define a classification policy where we annotate the information by assigning security levels to different parts of secBIP model (data variables, ports and interactions). The policy describes how information can flow from one classification with respect to the other.
As an example, we can classify public information as a Low (L) security level and secret (confidential) information as High (H) security level. Intuitively High security level is more restrictive than Low security level and we denote it by L ⊆ H. In general, security levels are elements of a security domain, defined as follows:
Definition 6 (security domain). A security domain is a lattice of the form S, ⊆, ∪, ∩ where:
-S is a finite set of security levels.
-⊆ is a partial order "can flow to" on S that indicates that information can flow from one security level to an equal or a more restrictive one. -∪ is a "join" operator for any two levels in S and that represents the upper bound of them. -∩ is a "meet" operator for any two levels in S and that represents the lower bound of them. As an example, consider the set S = {L, M 1 , M 2 , H} of security levels that are governed by the "can flow to" relation L ⊆ M 1 , L ⊆ M 2 , M 1 ⊆ H and M 2 ⊆ H. M 1 and M 2 are incomparable and we note M 1 M 2 and M 1 M 2 . This security domain is graphically illustrated in Figure 3 .
Let C = γ(B 1 , . . . B n ) be a composite component, fixed. Let X (resp. P ) be the set of all variables (resp. ports) defined in all atomic components (B i ) i=1,n .
Let S, ⊆, ∪, ∩ be a security domain, fixed.
Definition 7 (security assignment). A security assignment for component C is a mapping σ : X ∪ P ∪ γ → S that associates security levels to variables, ports and interactions such that, moreover, the security levels of ports matches the security levels of interactions, that is, for all a ∈ γ and for all p ∈ P it holds σ(p) = σ(a).
In atomic components, the security levels considered for ports and variables allow to track intra-component information flows and control the intermediate computation steps. Moreover, inter-components communication, that is, interactions with data exchange, are tracked by the security levels assigned to interactions.
In order to formally introduce the two notions of non-interference for secBIP models we need few additional notations, as follows. Let σ be a security assignment for C, fixed.
For a security level s ∈ S, we define γ ↓ σ s the restriction of γ to interactions with security level at most s that is formally, γ ↓ σ s = {a ∈ γ | σ(a) ⊆ s}. For a security level s ∈ S, we define w| σ s the projection of a trace w ∈ γ * to interactions with security level lower or equal to s. Formally, the projection is recursively defined on traces as ǫ| For a security level s ∈ S, we define the equivalence ≈ σ s on states of C. Two states q 1 , q 2 are equivalent, denoted by q 1 ≈ σ s q 2 iff (1) they coincide on variables having security levels at most s and (2) they coincide on control locations having outgoing transitions labeled with ports with security level at most s.
We are now ready to define the two notions of non-interference.
Definition 8 (event non-interference). The security assignment σ ensures event non-interference of γ(B 1 , . . . , B n ) at security level s iff,
Event non-interference ensures isolation/security at interaction level. The definition excludes the possibility to gain any relevant information about the occurrences of interactions (events) with strictly greater (or incomparable) levels than s, from the exclusive observation of occurrences of interactions with levels lower or equal to s. That is, an external observer is not able to distinguish between the case where such higher interactions are not observable on execution traces and the case these interactions have been actually statically removed from the composition. This definition is very close to Rushby's [Rus92] definition for transitive non-interference. But, let us remark that event non-interference is not concerned about the protection of data. The model consists of three atomic components comp i,i=1,2,3 . Different security levels have been assigned to ports and interactions: comp 1 is a low security component, comp 2 is a high security component, and comp 3 is mixed security component. The security levels are represented by dashed squares related to interactions, internal ports and variables. As a convention, we apply high (H) level for secret data and interactions and low(L) level for public ones. The set of traces is represented by the automaton in Figure 5 (a). The set of projected execution traces at security level L is represented by the automaton depicted in Figure 5 (b). This set is equal to the set of traces obtained by restricted composition, that is, using interaction with security level at most L and depicted in Figure 5 (c). Therefore, this example satisfies the event non-interference condition at level L. Definition 9 (data non-interference). The security assignment σ ensures data non-interference of C = γ(B 1 , . . . , B n ) at security level s iff,
Data non-interference provides isolation/security at data level. The definition ensures that, all states reached from initially indistinguishable states at security level s, by execution of arbitrary but identical traces whenever projected at level s, are also indistinguishable at level s. That means that observation of all variables and interactions with level s or lower excludes any gain of relevant information about variables at higher (or incomparable) level than s. Compared to event non-interference, data non-interference is a stronger property that considers the system's global states (local states and valuation of variables) and focus on their equivalence along identical execution traces (at some security level).
Example 1 a 2 , c 2 b 1 , c 1 , a 1 a 2 , the reached states by w 1 and w 2 are different, respectively ((l 2 , u = 4, v = 2), (l 5 , x = 3, y = 2), (l 6 , z = 1, w = 1)) and ((l 2 , u = 4, v = 2), (l 5 , x = 2, y = 2), (l 7 , z = 1, w = 0)) and moreover non-equivalent at low level L. Hence, this example is not data non-interferent at level L. 
Fig. 6. Example for data non-interference
Definition 10 (secure component). A security assignment σ is secure for a component γ(B 1 , . . . , B n ) iff it ensures both event and data non-interference, at all security levels s ∈ S.
Automated Verification of Non-Interference
We propose hereafter an automated verification technique of non-interference for secBIP models based on the so-called unwinding conditions. These conditions were first introduced by Goguen and Meseguer for the verification of transitive non-interference for deterministic systems [GM82] . In general, the unwinding approach reduces the verification of information flow security to the existence of certain unwinding relation. This relation is usually an equivalence relation on system states that respects some additional properties on atomic execution steps, which are shown sufficient to imply non-interference. In the case of secBIP, the additional properties are formulated in terms of individual interactions/events and therefore easier to handle.
Let C = γ(B 1 , . . . , B n ) be a composite component and let σ be a security assignment for C.
Definition 11 (unwinding relation). An equivalence ∼ s on states of C is called an unwinding relation for σ at security level s iff the two following conditions hold:
2. output and step consistency ∀q 1 , q 2 , q
The existence of unwinding relations is tightly related to non-interference. The following two theorems formalize this relation for the two types of noninterference defined. Let C be a composite component and σ a security assignment.
Theorem 1 (event non-interference).
If an unwinding relation ∼ s exists for the security assignment σ at security level s, then σ ensures event noninterference of C at level s.
Theorem 2 (data non-interference).
If the equivalence relation ≈ σ s is also an unwinding relation for the security assignment σ at security level s, then σ ensures data non-interference of C at level s.
The two theorems above are used to derive a practical verification method of non-interference using unwinding. We provide hereafter sufficient syntactic conditions ensuring that indeed the unwinding relations ∼ s and ≈ s exist on the system states. These conditions aim to effectively reduce the verification of non-interference to the checking on local constraints on both transitions (intra-component conditions) and interactions (inter-component conditions). Especially, they give an direct way to automate the verification.
Definition 12 (security conditions). Let C = γ(B 1 , . . . , B n ) be a composite component and let σ be a security assignment. We say that C satisfies the security conditions for security assignment σ iff:
(i) the security assignment of ports, in every atomic component B i is locally consistent, that is:
• for every pair of causal transitions:
• for every pair of conflicting transitions:
(ii) all assignments x := e occurring in transitions within atomic components and interactions are sequential consistent, in the classical sense:
(iii) variables are consistently used and assigned in transitions and interactions, that is,
(iv) all atomic components B i are port deterministic:
The first family of conditions (i) is similar to Accorsi's conditions [AL12] for excluding causal and conflicting places for Petri net transitions having different security levels. Similar conditions have been considered in [FG01, FGF09] and lead to more specific definitions of non-interferences and bisimulations on annotated Petri nets. The second condition (ii) represents the classical condition needed to avoid information leakage in sequential assignments. The third condition (iii) tackles covert channels issues. Indeed, (iii) enforces the security levels of the data flows which have to be consistent with security levels of the ports or interactions (e.g., no low level data has to be updated on a high level port or interaction). Such that, observations of public data would not reveal any secret information. Finally, conditions (iv) enforces deterministic behavior on atomic components.
The relation between the syntactic security conditions and the unwinding relations is precisely captured by the following theorem.
Theorem 3 (unwinding theorem). Whenever the security conditions hold, the equivalence relation ≈ σ s is an unwinding relation for the security assignment σ, at all security level s.
The following result is the immediate consequence of theorems 1, 2 and 3. Corollary 1. Whenever the security conditions hold, the security assignment σ is secure for the component C.
We illustrate the secBIP framework to handle information flow security issues for a classical example, the web service reservation system proposed in [HV06] . A businessman, living in France, plans to go to Berlin for a private and secret mission. To organize his travel, he uses an intelligent web service who contacts two travel agencies: The first agency, AgencyA, arranges flights in Europe and the second agency, AgencyB, arranges flights exclusively to Germany. The reservation service obtains in return specific flight information and their corresponding prices and chooses the flight that is more convenient for him.
In this example, there are two types of interference that can occur, (1) datainterference since learning the flight price may reveal the flight destination and (2) event interference, since observing the interaction with AgencyB can reveal the destination as well. Thus, to keep the mission private, the flight prices and interactions with AgencyB have to be kept confidential. The modeling of the system using secBIP involves two main distinct steps: first, functional requirements modeling reflecting the system behavior, and second, security annotations enforcing the desired security policy. The model of the system has four components denoted: Travel A and Travel B who are instances from the same component and correspond respectively to AgencyA and AgencyB, and components Reservation and Payment. To avoid Figure 7 cluttering, we did not represent the interactions with Travel A component. Search parameters are supplied by a user through the Reservation component ports dests and dates to which we associate respectively variables (f rom, to) and dates. Next, through search interaction, Reservation component contacts Travel B component to search for available flights and obtains in return a list L of specific flights with their corresponding prices. Thereafter, Reservation component selects a ticket t i from the list L and requests the Payment component to perform the payment.
All the search parameters f rom, to, dates, as well as the flights list L are set to low since users are not identified while sending these queries. Other sensitive data like the selected flight t i , the price variable p and the payment parameters (identity id, credit card variable cna and code number cno) are set to high. Internal ports dests and dates as well as search, fly list, accept interactions are set to low since these interactions (events) do not reveal any information about the client private trip. However, the select f ly interaction must be set to high since the observation of the selection event from AgencyB allow to deduce deduce the client destination. In the case of a selected flight from AgencyA, the select f ly interaction could be set to low since, in this case, the destination could not be deduced just from the event occurrence.
We recall that any system can be proven non-interferent iff it satisfies the syntactic security conditions from Definition 12. Indeed, these conditions hold for the system model depicted in Figure 7 . In particular, it can be easily checked that all assignments occurring in transitions within atomic component as well as within interactions are sequential consistent. For example, at the select f ly interaction we assign a low level security item from the flight list L to a high security level variable ti, formally t i = L[i]. Besides, the security levels assignments to ports exclude inconsistencies due to causal and conflicting transitions, in all atomic components.
Related Work
Non-interference properties have been already studied using different modelbased approaches. Recently, [SS12] adapted an MDS method for handling information flow security using UML sequence diagrams. Additionally, Petri-nets have been extensively used for system modeling and information flow security verifications tools such as InDico [AWD11] have been developed. A componentbased model has been proposed in [ASRL11] and used to study implementation issues of secure information flows. Our presented work on secBIP is however different and original in several respects.
First, secBIP is a formal framework. Unlike UML, system's runtime behavior is always meaningfully defined and can be formally analyzed. Moreover, secBIP provides a system construction methodology for complex systems. Indeed, big systems are functionally decomposed into multiple sub-components communicating through well-defined interactions. Such a structural decomposition of the system is usually not available on Petri-nets models.
Second, secBIP handles both event and data-flow non-interference, in a single semantic model. To the best of our knowledge, these properties have never been jointly considered for component-based models. Nevertheless, the need to consider together event and data flow non-interference has been recently identified in the existing literature. The bottom line is that preserving the safety of data flow in a system does not necessarily preserve safe observability on system's public behavior (i.e., secret/private executions may have an observable impact on system public events). The issue has been recently considered in [AL12] , for data leaks and information leaks in business processes based on system's data-flows and work-flows. Also, [BBMP08] showed that formal verification of the system's event behavior is not sufficient to guarantee specific data properties. Furthermore, [FRS05] attempted to fill the gap between respectively language-based and process calculus-based information security and make an explicit distinction between preventing the data leakage through the execution of programs and preventing secret events from being revealed in inter-process communications.
Third, compared to security-typed programming languages [jif,ZZNM02] and operating systems [KYB + 07,ZBWM08,EKV + 05] enforcing information flow control, secBIP is a component-based modeling approach where non-interference is established at a more abstract level. Thus, secBIP can be apriori implemented using different programming languages and is independent from a specific operating system and execution platform.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that a lot of classical approaches fall short to handle information flow security [Zda04] for real systems. For secBIP we privilege a very pragmatic approach and provide simple (syntactic) sufficient conditions allowing to automate the verification of non-interference. These conditions allow to eliminate a significant amount of security leakages, especially covert channels, independently from system language or the execution platform. However, these conditions can be very restrictive in some cases and a system designer may be interested to relax the non-interference properties.
Conclusion and Future Work
We present a MDS framework to secure component-based systems. We formally define two types of non-interference, respectively event and data noninterference. We provide a set of sufficient syntactic conditions which simplify verification of non-interference. These conditions are extensions of security typed language rules applied to our model. The use of our framework has been demonstrated to secure a web service application.
This work is currently being extended in two directions. First, we are investigating additional security conditions allowing to relax the non-interference property and control where downgrading can occur. Second, we are working towards the implementation of a complete design flow for secure systems based on secBIP. As a first step, we shall implement the verification method presented for annotated secBIP models. Then, use these models for generation of secure implementations, that is, executable code where the security properties are enforced by construction, at the generation time. (γ(B 1 , . . . , B n ), q 0 ) and moreover, for every state q ′ such that q 0
Proof. The lemma is proved by induction on the length of the trace w. For the empty trace w = ǫ verification is trivial: ∼ s holds for the initial state q 0 ∼ s q 0 and ǫ = ǫ| σ s . By induction hypothesis, let assume the property holds for traces of length n. We shall prove the property for traces of length n + 1. Let w ′ = wa be an arbitrary trace of length n + 1, let w be its prefix (trace) of length n and let a be the last interaction. Consider states q, q 1 such that q 0 is indeed a valid trace. Moreover, since q ∼ s q ′ the unwinding condition (2) ensures also that q 1 ∼ s q ′ 1 , which proves the result.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Let us consider two equivalent states q 1 ≈ σ s q 2 . The first condition for data non-interference requires that, for any trace w 1 from q 1 there exists a trace w 2 from q 2 having the same projection at level s, that is,
We shall prove a slightly stronger property, namely, the trace w 2 can be chosen such that, the successors q . The induction step: we assume, by induction hypothesis that the property holds for any traces w 1 , w 2 such that |w 1 | + |w 2 | ≤ n and we shall prove it for all traces w
